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The Eurodollar and the Risk of
Currency Restrictions
In our age the interest of the general public in natural sciences
and technology is so great that progress in those fields is reported
regularly in newspapers and non-scientific periodicals. When it comes
to changes or new phenomena in finance or banking, the public-and
those writing for it-shy away. The Paris edition of The New York
Herald Tribune, speaking of the Eurodollar market, referred to "that
complex financial market fully understood only by the financial
brotherhood who deal in it."'I Indeed, the subject has a growing
literature for both professionals and the intelligent public.'
* The author is managing director of the Lavoro Bank A.G., Zurich; profes-
sorial lecturer in monetary law, George Washington University Law School (on
leave of absence); and member of the New York and Washington, D.C., Bars.
The present article was completed in May 1965 and brought up-to-date in
August 1966.
1 New York Herald Tribune, European Edition, April 7, 1965, page 11, Col. 4.
2Cf. Johnson, N. 0., "Eurodollars in the New International Money Markets,"
First National City Bank, New York, 1964. Altman, 0. L., "Foreign Markets for
Dollars, Sterling, and Other Currencies," VIII. 3. Staff Papers, Internat. Mone-
tary Fund, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1961, pp. 313-352 (referred to in this
article as "Foreign Markets for Dollars"). Altman, 0. L., "Recent Developments
in Foreign Markets for Dollars and Other Currencies." Document of Internat.
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1962, also: I.M.F. Staff Papers,
Nov. 1962, pp. 297-316. Altman, 0. L., "Canadian Markets for U.S. Dollars."
Staff Papers, Int. Monet. Fund, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1962; Reinhardt, E.,
Probl~mes actuels de l'exportation des capitaux (Zurich, 1963); Lademann, J.,
"Struktur und Auswirkung des Euro-Dollar Markets," Neue Ziiricher Zeitung,
Handelsteil, Aug. 17, 1963, No. 3253, and Aug. 19, 1963, No. 3271. Koszul,
J.-P., "Eurodollar Market Risky but likely to last," European Community,
August 1964, No. 74, p. 9. Nahum, J. G., "Les March6s Monetairs Interna-
tionaux," Banque. Paris, Vol. 40, Apr. 1965, p. 227. Bank for International
Settlements, Thirty-Fourth Annual Report, Basel, June 1964 (pp. 127-141).
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The Eurodollar
The confusion connected with the Eurodollar is due largely to
misleading terminology which, in turn, has a historical explanation.
In the early Fifties, the U.S.S.R. possessed substantial funds of
U.S. dollars which, in the atmosphere of tension then prevailing, it
did not wish to deposit with U.S. banks for fear of blocking or vesting.
The funds were held by the Banque Commerciale pour 'Europe du
Nord, a bank in Paris which redeposited these dollars with various
European banks at attractive interest rates. The receiving banks
passed on again the funds to other banks, and a market of a certain
volume was created. The cable address of Banque Commerciale pour
l'Europe du Nord, Eurobank, gave the name "Eurodollar" to the
-funds which were thus traded among the foreign exchange dealers.
A few years later, it was observed in the United States that in
view of higher interest paid by European banks on dollar deposits,
funds in substantial amounts were transferred from American to
European banks. The term Eurodollar was then applied also to these
deposits. It was soon realized that these funds of American origin
are but a fraction of the dollars deposited with banks in Europe, and
outside Europe, and that there existed a vigorous market among non-
American banks giving and taking dollars as short-term loans. This
has been referred to as the Eurodollar market. Similar, although
smaller, markets have developed in pounds sterling, Swiss francs,
Italian lire, and other currencies. It has been rightly pointed out '
that it is misleading to refer to all these various moneys traded in and
outside Europe as Eurodollars.
The deposits in the Euromarket are made for short periods of
time: 48 hours, 30 days, 90 days, and only exceptionally for longer
periods. It is one characteristic of the market that the deposit which
is originally made with, say, bank A in country X, is very often passed
on to bank B in country Y at a slightly higher interest rate, and fre-
quently even to a third bank in a third country again at an interest
rate a fraction higher before it reaches the borrowing public.' The
market has operated very smoothly until now and the marginal profits
made by the banks are economically well justified in bringing the
funds to where the effective demand is the greatest.'
1 E.g., editorial in Neue Zuricher Zeitung, No. 4289, Dec. 4, 1960.
' Solmssen, H. K., Eurogeld geht durch viele Hdnde. Borsen-Zeitung, Frank-
furt a.M., No. 223, 20. Nov. 1964.
5 For a brief description in non-technical language of the way a foreign ex-
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The dimensions of this market are beyond the imagination of
the outsider, 9.5 billion dollars according to one recent estimate.,
The market would probably continue to grow but for certain perils
instinctively felt by the operators. In analyzing what these intrinsic
dangers are, specifically in connection with the Euromarket opera-
tions, one finds that they are to some extent legal in nature: (1) the
debts of the participating banks in various countries are assumed to
be governed by the same legal rules, whereas they often are not, and
(2) supervenient currency regulations (including blocking or vesting
of the funds) may affect transferability from country to country.
The present analysis deals with the risks of currency restrictions
inherent in the Euromarket.
Currency Restrictions and the EuromarketT
What particularly concerns bankers as well as their clients is not
so much the existing but the potential currency restrictions, because
if a certain transaction is not permitted under existing regulations, if
acceptance or repayment of a foreign money deposit or loan is pro-
hibited, the business will not be concluded. Hence, the impending
regulations are of more concern, those which at the time of contracting
of the agreement are not in force but which might be enacted before
repayment. Prospective enactments will not be reviewed here, but
some remarks will nevertheless be useful on how future currency
restrictions may affect currency operations.
Potential currency regulations * can attack Eurodollar and other
Eurocurrency claims on two fronts: it maybe the country of the
debtor bank which imposes the restrictions (lex debitoris), or again
the country whose currency is used and where ultimately the funds
are deposited (lex monetae). In an example where an Egyptian
national deposits Swiss francs with a London bank, the creditor might
not receive payment if restrictions enacted in Great Britain after the
deposit was made prohibit payment, or if Swiss regulations-horribile
dictu-block or vest the funds, or prohibit transfers.
change dealer operates in Europe ci. Pelli, G., "Foreign Exchange," Swiss Bank
Corporation, Zurich, 1964.
6 Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report for 1965. Neue Ziiricher
Zeitung, July 1, 1966, No. 2901, p. 4.
7This part has been adapted from the author's "Legal Nature of the Euro-
dollar," 13 American Journal of Comparative Law 30, 1964, and is included here
by the kind permission of the Journal.
* This term is used here in the broadest sense and includes, for example, pro-
visions for the blocking and vesting of foreign assets.
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(a) Restrictions of Lex Debitoris. When the law of the debtor
bank regulates the contract and imposes restrictions on the bank,
these restrictions will be part of the applicable law and need not, it
seems, be stipulated beforehand. It is interesting to note that some
banks nevertheless go out of their way to do so. The General Terms
of Italian banks for instance, as will be seen,8 contain the express
provision that "any lien, restriction charge or loss due to . . . regula-
tions issued by authorities in Italy or abroad . . . are to be borne by
the holder of the account" (emphasis added). It is possible that the
inclusion of Italian regulations was deemed necessary in drafting
because it was believed that if the foreign, but not the Italian, restric-
tions alone were mentioned, the latter could be regarded a contrario
as not applicable. The uniform General Terms of German banks also
contain an express provision that the owner of foreign money accounts
bears the results of, and damages deriving from, regulations issued
domestically as well as abroad.' The examples could be multiplied.
The situation of overseas branches of American banks is of
particular interest. When the higher interest rates paid in Europe in
1958 and following years lured American funds to Europe (in the
beginning particularly to London), one of the factors that slowed the
stream of transfers was the fear of future currency restrictions: the
European banks pay higher interests, it was said, but is the money
safe there? The obvious thought was to deposit the funds with the
European branches of American banks because the branch, it was
believed, has no legal personality of its own, its debts are those of the
American bank, and if currency restrictions in one of the European
countries were to prohibit payment or retransfer to America, the bank
in the United States would honor its obligation. It is very much to
the credit of American banks that, eager as they have been to increase
the dollar deposits with their European branches, "they try to make
it very clear to dollar depositors in their overseas branches that the
withdrawal of these dollars is subject to local currency regulations,
and that they are not obligated in the event that local laws restrict or
prohibit payment. Depositors of dollars in their foreign branches are
generally required to sign an understanding to that effect." 10
(b) Restrictions of Lex Monetae. The laws of a country regu-
lating its monetary system affect generally any monetary obligation
8 Example No. 4 in note 11, infra.
9 See infra, note 11, Example 3.
10 Altman, "Foreign Markets for Dollars," supra note 2, p. 322.
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contracted in the money of that country, whether the parties are
nationals of that country or not; but as respects payment restrictions
in a given country, blocking or vesting assets, the situation is different.
Thus, if the monetary unit of a country is devalued, all debts con-
tracted in the money of that country will usually be automatically
affected; what is owed is a given number of a given monetary unit,
whatever that unit may be under the laws relating to that particular
money; but if the country whose money is involved imposes restrictive
measures on debts, those usually do not affect the obligations of out-
siders. Were the United States to block the assets of, say, Swiss banks,
this by itself would probably not relieve the Swiss banks of their
obligations to pay the dollar debts which they might owe to their
depositors.
This would impose a disproportionate risk on banks which usu-
ally stipulate therefore that the supervenient risk of currency restric-
tions of the lex monetae are to be borne by the depositor."
"I A few examples of such relevant stipulations follow:
Example 1: A Swiss Bank in Zurich: "It is understood that your dollar
deposit is redeposited with one of our correspondents in the United States in
our name and at our disposal, but at your risk and is subject to all present and
future laws, decisions, measures, etc. in that country." German original text:
"Es ist verstanden, dass Ihr Guthaben auf Dollar-Konto zwar auf unserem
Namen und zu unserer Verfilgung, jedoch auf Ihr Risiko bei einem unserer
Korrespondenten in den USA deponiert ist und allen bestehenden und zukiinft-
igen Gesetzen, Entscheidungen, Massanahmen, usw. in diesem Land unterliegt."
Example 2: Branch of a United States Bank in Geneva: "Because a custo-
mer's non-Swiss currency account has its counterpart at the Bank's correspon-
dents or branches in the country of the currency involved, all of the regulations
of the country of the currency of the account are applicable to the customer's
account with the Bank, particularly as regards the availability of holdings in
that currency."
Example 3: German banks, uniform text, Article 3(2): "The owners of
foreign money deposits participate in all economic and legal disadvantages and
damages which affect the total deposits of the Bank held abroad in the respective
currency as a result of vis major, war, civil commotion or similar events, or due
to acts of third persons, not attributable to the Bank, abroad or in connection
with regulations enacted by the domestic or foreign authorities." German original
text: "Die Inhaber von Wdihrungsguthaben tragen anteilig alle wirtschaftlichen
und rechtlichen Nachteile und Sch~iden, die das im Auslande unterhaltene
Gesamtguthaben der Bank in der entsprechenden Wihrung als Folge von
hherer Gewalt, Krieg, Aufruhr oder iihnlichen Ereignissen oder durch von der
Bank nicht verschuldete Zugriffe Dritter im Auslande oder im Zusammenhang
mit Verfiigungen von hoher Hand des In-oder Auslandes treffen sollten."
Example 4: Italian Banks: "Any lien, restriction, charge or loss due to force
majeure, to fortuitous circumstances or regulations issued by Authorities in
Italy or abroad, or however originated from causes not ascribable to the bank,
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The Fund Agreement and the Euromarket
With the notable exception of Switzerland, the countries partici-
pating in the Euromarket are all parties to the Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund. The Agreement requires the
member states to refrain from imposing certain restrictions; Article
VIII, Section 2. (a) reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b), and Arti-
cle XIV, Section 2, no member shall, without the approval of the
Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and trans-
fers for current international transactions.
The question to be answered is whether the obligations in the Euro-
market are of such character that their discharge is "payment for
current transactions." Article XIX (i) gives the following indication
as to what is to be regarded as current payment:
Payments for current transactions mean payments which are not
for the purpose of transferring capital, and include without
limitation:
1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other cur-
rent business including services, and normal short-term bank-
ing and credit facilities;
2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from
other investments;
3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for
depreciation of direct investments;
4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses. The Fund
may, after consultation with the members concerned, deter-
mine whether certain specific transactions are to be consid-
ered current transactions or capital transactions.
This "indication" has been strongly criticized as being too vague to
be considered as a definition, and also for other reasons, 2 but for a
European banker there can be little doubt that the normal Euromarket
transaction-a deposit between banks running up to 90 days-falls
squarely under Article XIX (i) (1) as "normal short-term credit
facilities."
All this, obviously, gives comfort to a participant in the Euro-
are to be borne by the holder of the account." The examples could be multiplied
in great number.
12 The difficulty of distinguishing clearly capital movements from current
transactions are, indeed, very great. Cf. F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspects of
Money, (second edition) Oxford, 1953, p. 340, also, same author in Money in
Private International Law, also "Paiement courant et paiement en capitaux,"
Document No. 107 of the Monetary Law Committee of the International Law
Association (1964) passim.
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market but does not entirely relieve him from all anxieties. There
are four fronts on which currency restrictions can attack the fortress
created by Article VIII: the three exceptions referred to in Arti-
cle VIII, Section (a) itself, and the breach of the Agreement by the
member country.
The prohibition to impose restrictions on current payments and
transfers does not apply, as can be seen from the text quoted above:
(a) if the Fund approves the restrictions (see text of Art. VIII,
Section 2. (a) quoted above):
(b) if the Fund authorizes the temporary imposition of limitations
according to Art. VII, Section 3; 1' and
(c) if the restrictions are part of the post-war transitional period
within the meaning of Art. XIV, Section 2.14
The first two possibilities are, of course, very real ones. To
safeguard the monetary system of the world by protecting the currency
of one or more of its members, the Fund may grant the required
approval. But looking at the problem with an eye on past perfor-
mance and the spirit of the Agreement, it is very probable that the
Fund will extend all necessary help, and call on other countries and
organizations for assistance, before it consents to currency restrictions
on current transactions.
The third possibility (restriction during post-war transitional
period) appears to be academic. The member countries participating
in the Euromarket all permit these Euromarket transactions at this
time so that even if Art. XIV, Section 2 would apply at this late day
because a country argues that it is still in the "post-war transitional
period," it could not re-introduce currency restrictions on current
transactions already made free.
The last possibility, the introduction of currency restrictions in
defiance of the Fund Agreement is, in this author's opinion, a remote
possibility. Not because he has such great faith in the ethical standard
of all countries at all times, but because the breach of the Agreement
would have disastrous consequences for the member. The member
would become ineligible to use the resources of the Fund,"5 and might
be required to withdraw from membership in the Fund.1" There would
be further immediate practical consequences, however. The banks of
13 Art. VII, Sec. 3.
14 Art. XIV, Sec. 2.
15 Art. XV, Sec. 2 (a).
16 Art. XV, See. 2 (b).
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the countries participating in the Euromarket have assets scattered
around the world. If a country's currency restrictions which are not
contrary to the Fund Agreement prohibit the banks of that country
to fulfil their obligations, these restrictions are respected by the courts
and agencies of the other member countries "7 but would probably be
disregarded if the currency restrictions are in the teeth of the Fund
Agreement. In this case the assets of the banks of the breaching
country could be attached in third countries; this would lead to a
complete breakdown of that country's international banking. No
country is likely to bring upon itself this disaster.
17 Art. VIII, Sec. 2 (b).
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